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Abstract
We study reflection principles of Peano Arithmetic PA which are
based on both proof and provability. Any such reflection principle in
PA is equivalent to either ✷P → P (✷P stands for P is provable) or
✷
k
u:P →P for some k ≥ 0 (t:P states t is a proof of P ). Reflection
principles constitute a non-collapsing hierarchy with respect to their
deductive strength
u:P→P ≺ ✷u:P→P ≺ ✷2u:P→P ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P→P.
1 Introduction
Reflection Principles are classical objects in Proof Theory. They were in-
troduced by Rosser [18] and Turing [23] in the 1930s, and later studied by
Feferman [8, 9], Kreisel and Le´vi [11], Schmerl [19], Artemov [1], Beklemishev
[5, 6], and many others (cf. survey [4]).
A proof predicate is a provably decidable formula Proof that enumerates
all theorems of PA,
PA ⊢ ϕ iff Proof (k, ϕ) for some k.
∗Supported by PSC CUNY Research Awards program.
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In this paper all proof predicates are assumed normal ([3]), t.e.
1. for every k set
T (k) = {ϕ | Proof (k, ϕ)}
is finite, the function from k to T (k) is computable;
2. for any k and l there is n such that
T (k) ∪ T (l) ⊆ T (n).
Prime example: Go¨del’s proof predicate.
A natural example of a Reflection Principle is given by so-called local
(or implicit) reflection. Let Provable F be ∃xProof (x, F ). In the formal
provability setting, the local reflection principle is the set of all arithmetical
formulas
Provable F → F ,
where F is an arithmetical formula. Though all the instances of this reflection
principle are true in the standard model of Peano Arithmetic PA, some of
them are not provable. For example, if F is falsum ⊥, the local reflection
principle becomes Go¨del’s consistency formula
¬Provable ⊥.
Another example is given by the explicit reflection principle, i.e., the set
of formulas
Proof (t, F )→F
where t is an arbitrary proof term, and F an arithmetical formula. Here the
situation is quite different; all instances of explicit reflection are provable.
Indeed, if Proof (t, F ) holds, then F is obviously provable in PA, and so
is formula Proof (t, F )→F . If ¬Proof (t, F ) holds, then it is provable in PA
(since ¬Proof (x, y) is decidable) and Proof (t, F )→F is again provable.
We study (cf. [17]) reflection principles of Peano Arithmetic PA which
are based on both proof and provability predicates. (cf. [3, 7]).
Let P be a propositional letter and each of Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm is either ‘✷’
standing for provability in PA, or ‘u :’ standing for
‘u is a proof of . . . in PA’,
u is a fresh proof variable. Then the formula
Q1Q2 . . . QmP→P
2
is called generator, and the set of all its arithmetical instances is the reflection
principle corresponding to this generator. We will refer to reflection principles
using their generators.
It is immediate that all reflection principles without explicit proofs (Qi =
✷ for all i) are equivalent to the local reflection principle ✷P→P . All ✷-free
reflection principles are provable in PA and hence equivalent to u :P → P .
Mixing explicit proofs and provability yields infinitely many new reflection
principles:
1. Any reflection principle in PA is equivalent to either ✷P → P or
✷
ku:P→P for some k ≥ 0.
2. Reflection principles constitute a non-collapsing hierarchy with respect
to their deductive strength
u:P→P ≺ ✷u:P→P ≺ ✷2u:P→P ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P→P.
The proofs essentially rely on introduced by the author Go¨del-Lo¨b-Arte¨mov
logic GLA of formal provability and explicit proofs.
2 Description and basic properties of GLA
We describe the logic GLA introduced in [12] (see also [16]) in the union of the
original languages of Go¨del-Lo¨b Logic GL(cf. [7, 21]) and Artemov’s Logic of
Proofs LP([3]).
The following two systems were predecessors of GLA:
• system B from [2], which did not have operations on proofs;
• system LPP from [20, 22] in an extension of languages of the logic of
formal provability GL and the Logic of Proofs LP.
The immediate successors of GLA are the logic GrzA ([14]) of strong provabil-
ity and explicit proofs and symmetric logic of proofs and provability ([15]).
Language of GLA.
Proof terms are built from proof variables x, y, z, . . . and proof constants
a, b, c, . . . by means of two binary operations: application ‘·’ and union ‘+’,
and one unary proof checker ‘!’.
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Formulas of GLA are defined by the grammar
A = S | A→A | A ∧A | A ∨A | ¬A | ✷A | t:A ,
where t stands for any proof term and S for any sentence letter.
Axioms and rules of both Go¨del-Lo¨b logic GL and LP, together with
three specific principles connecting explicit proofs with formal provability,
constitute GLA∅.
I. Axioms of classical propositional logic
Standard axioms of the classical logic (e.g., A1-A10 from [10])
II. Axioms of Provability Logic GL
GL1 ✷(F→G)→ (✷F→✷G) Deductive Closure/Normality
GL2 ✷F→✷✷F Positive Introspection/Transitivity
GL3 ✷(✷F→F )→✷F Lo¨b Principle
III. Axioms of the Logic of Proofs LP
LP1 s:(F→G) → (t:F→ [s·t]:G) Application
LP2 t:F → !t:(t:F ) Proof Checker
LP3 s:F→ [s+t]:F , t:F→ [s+t]:F Sum
LP4 t:F→F Explicit Reflection
IV. Axioms connecting explicit and formal provability
C1 t:F→✷F Explicit-Implicit connection
C2 ¬t:F→✷¬t:F Explicit-Implicit Negative Introspection
C3 t:✷F→F Explicit-Implicit Reflection
V. Rules of inference
R1 F→G, F ⊢ G Modus Ponens
R2 ⊢ F ⇒ ⊢ ✷F Necessitation
R3 ⊢ ✷F ⇒ ⊢ F Reflection Rule
A Constant Specification CS for GLA is the set of formulas
{c1:A1, c2:A2, c3:A3, . . .},
where each Ai is an axiom of GLA∅ and each ci is a proof constant.
GLACS = GLA∅ + CS,
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GLA = GLACS with the “total” CS.
One of the principal properties of GLA is its ability to internalize its own
proofs [16]: If GLA ⊢ F , then for some proof term p, GLA ⊢ p:F .
An arithmetical interpretation ∗ of a GLA-formula is the direct sum of
corresponding arithmetical interpretations for GL and LP; in particular,
(✷G)∗ = Provable G∗;
(p:F )∗ = Proof (p∗, F ∗).
GLA is sound with respect to the arithmetical provability interpretation
([12, 16]):
For any Constant Specification CS and any arithmetical interpretation ∗
respecting CS, if GLACS ⊢ F then PA ⊢ F
∗.
The following arithmetical completeness theorem holds ([12, 16]):
For any finite constant specification CS, if GLACS 6⊢ F , then for some
interpretation ∗ respecting CS, PA 6⊢ F ∗.
In [13, 16], GLA was supplied with Kripke-style semantics and found to
be complete with respect to it.
3 Reflection principles in Peano Arithmetic
Fix a normal proof predicate Proof and, therefore, the corresponding prov-
ability predicate Provable. If F is a GLA-formula, then {F ∗} denotes the set
of all arithmetical interpretations of F based on Proof and Provable.
Definition 1 Let P be a propositional letter and each of Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm be
either ✷ or ‘u:’ for some fresh proof variable u. Then a formula
Q1Q2 . . . QmP→P
is called a generator and the set {[Q1Q2 . . . QmP→P ]
∗} is a reflection prin-
ciple corresponding to this generator.
For example, the implicit reflection principle is generated by GLA-formula
✷P→P , the explicit reflection is generated by u:P→P .
Definition 2 Let G and H be GLA-formulas. We say that {H∗}  {G∗},
or H  G, for short, if PA+ {G∗} proves all formulas from {H∗}. H ≃ G (is
read as “H is equivalent to G”) means that both H  G and G  H hold;
H ≺ G stands for (H  G and H 6≃ G).
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Example:
u:P→P ≺ ✷P→P.
We study the structure of reflection principles in the explicit-implicit
language. In particular, we establish classification of reflection principles
(Theorem 4):
Any reflection principle is equivalent to either ✷P → P or, for some
k ≥ 0, to ✷ku:P→P .
We also discover that reflection principles constitute a hierarchy (Theorem
5):
u:P→P ≺ ✷u:P→P ≺ ✷2u:P→P ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P→P.
These two results could be immediately concluded from the well-known fact
(Lemma 2):
¬⊥ ≺ ¬✷⊥ ≺ ¬✷2⊥ ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P→P
together with the following assertions we will establish in this section:
1. For each n ≥ 1, ✷nP → P ≃ ✷P → P (Uniqueness of Provability
Reflection, Theorem 1);
2. For k ≥ 0, ✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ≃ ✷
ku:P→P (Theorem 3);
3. For k ≥ 0, ✷ku:P→P ≃ ¬✷k⊥, (Theorem 6).
3.1 Uniqueness of Provability Reflection
Let Q1Q2 . . . QmP→P be a generator, and Q1Q2 . . . Qm consists only of im-
plicit provability operators ✷. It is obvious that the corresponding principle
is equivalent to ✷P→P .
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness of Provability Reflection)
Proof. In light of the arithmetic soundness of GLA∅,
✷P→P  ✷nP→P
follows from the fact that GLA∅ ⊢ ✷P → ✷
nP . The converse inequality
✷
nP→P  ✷P→P is implied by the fact that
[✷nP→✷n−1P ] ∧ [✷n−1P→✷n−2P ] ∧ . . . ∧ [✷P→P ]→ [✷nP→P ]
is derivable in GLA∅. ✷
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3.2 Leading-Explicit Reflection Principles are provable
Theorem 2 For any n ≥ 0, GLA∅ ⊢ u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P .
Proof. Induction on n. The base case n = 0 is trivial. For the induction
step consider two cases.
Case 1 : Q1 is “v:” for some proof variable v. Then, by explicit reflection,
GLA∅ ⊢ u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→v:Q2 . . . QnP.
By the Induction Hypothesis,
GLA∅ ⊢ v:Q2 . . . QnP→P.
Hence
GLA∅ ⊢ u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P.
Case 2 : Q1 is ✷. Then u :Q1Q2 . . . QnP has type u :✷
mF for some
m ≥ 1, where F is either P or w :Qn−m−1 . . . QnP . Now we show that
GLA∅ ⊢ u:✷
mF→F . Indeed,
1. ¬✷mF→¬u:✷mF , by E-reflection;
2. ¬u:✷mF→✷(¬u:✷mF ), axiom C2;
3. ✷(¬u:✷mF )→✷(u:✷mF→F ), by reasoning in GL;
4. ¬✷mF→✷(u:✷mF→F ), from 1,2, and 3;
5. ✷(u:✷mF→F )→✷m(u:✷mF→F ), from transitivity;
6. ¬✷mF→✷m(u:✷mF→F ), from 4 and 5;
7. ✷mF→✷m(u:✷mF→F ), by reasoning in GL;
8. ✷m(u:✷mF→F ), from 6 and 7;
9. u:✷mF→F , by Reflection Rule.
If F is P we are done; if F is w :Qn−m−1 . . . QnP , then, by the Induction
Hypothesis, GLA∅ ⊢ F→P which yields the theorem claim as well. ✷
Corollary 1 (Uniqueness of Leading-Explicit Reflection) Let u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→
P be a reflection principle generator. Then
u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ≃ u:P→P.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2 by the arithmetical soundness of GLA∅. ✷
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3.3 Classification of Reflection Principles
Theorem 3 Let k ≥ 0 and ✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P be a reflection principle
generator. Then
✷
ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ≃ ✷
ku:P→P.
Proof. The following argument could not be done in GLA; so, we reason in
PA instead.
First, we establish “”, i.e.,
PA
′ = PA+ {[✷ku:P→P ]∗} ⊢ {[✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ]
∗}.
Fix an interpretation ∗. By Theorem 1,
PA ⊢ u∗:[Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
∗→P ∗.
We write t:F for Proof (t, F ) and ✷F for Provable F in PA, for brevity.
Let s be its proof in PA. Then,
PA ⊢ s:(u∗:[Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
∗→P ∗).
By proof checking and internalized Modus Ponens in PA, we can find an
arithmetical proof t such that
PA ⊢ u∗:[Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
∗→ t:P ∗,
from which we conclude
PA ⊢ ✷ku∗:[Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
∗→✷kt:P ∗,
PA
′ ⊢ ✷ku∗:[Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
∗→P ∗,
i.e.,
PA
′ ⊢ [✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ]
∗.
Let us now establish “”, i.e., that
PA
′′ = PA+ {[✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ]
∗} ⊢ {[✷ku:P→P ]∗}.
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Lemma 1 For each interpretation ∗ there is an interpretation ♯ which coin-
cides with ∗ on P such that
PA ⊢ [u:P ]∗→ [u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
♯.
Proof. By induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. Let for some interpre-
tation ♭ coinciding with ∗ on P ,
PA ⊢ [u:P ]∗→ [u:Q2 . . . QnP ]
♭.
By proof-checking,
PA ⊢ [u:P ]∗→ !u♭:u♭:[Q2 . . . QnP ]
♭.
Case 1. If Q1 is a proof variable v, then define u
♯ as !u♭, v♯ as u♭, set ♯ to
be ♭ everywhere else, and get the desired
PA ⊢ [u:P ]∗→ [u:v:Q2 . . . QnP ]
♯.
Case 2. If Q1 is ✷, then by reasoning in PA find a proof t such that
PA ⊢!u♭:u♭:[Q2 . . . QnP ]
♭→ t:✷[Q2 . . . QnP ]
♭,
therefore, PA ⊢ [u:P ]∗→ t:✷[Q2 . . . QnP ]
♭. Define u♯ = t (u is fresh!) and set
♯ equal ♭ everywhere else. Then
PA ⊢ [u:P ]∗→ [u:Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
♯,
which completes theorem’s proof. ✷
Now, by the standard PA-reasoning,
PA ⊢ [✷ku:P ]∗→ [✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP ]
♯,
and since
PA
′′ ⊢ [✷ku:Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P ]
♯
and P ♯ = P ∗ we conclude that
PA
′′ ⊢ [✷ku:P→P ]∗.
✷
From Theorems 1 and 3 immediately follows
9
Theorem 4 (Classification of Reflection Principles) Any reflection prin-
ciple is equivalent to either
✷P→P
or, for some k ≥ 0, to
✷
ku:P→P.
Proof. Consider and arbitrary reflection principle π
Q1Q2 . . . QnP→P.
If all Qi are ✷’s, then, by Theorem 1, π = ✷P → P . Otherwise, π can be
written as
✷
ku:Qn−k−1 . . . QnP→P
for an appropriate k ≥ 0. By Theorem 3, π = ✷ku:P→P . ✷
3.4 Hierarchy of Reflection Principles
Theorem 5 Reflection principles form a linear ordering
u:P→P ≺ ✷u:P→P ≺ ✷2u:P→P ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P→P.
This Theorem is an immediate corollary of the following two assertions.
Theorem 6 For each k ≥ 0, ✷ku:P→P ≃ ¬✷k⊥.
Proof. Putting P = ⊥ we get ✷ku:P→P  ¬✷k⊥. For the converse, argue
in GLA∅. Case k = 0 is trivial. Let k ≥ 1. Assume ¬✷
k⊥, ✷ku:P , and ¬P
and look for a contradiction. By explicit reflection, from ¬P we derive ¬u:P
and, by explicit-implicit negative introspection, ✷¬u:P . By transitivity, we
get ✷k¬u:P . From this and ✷ku:P , by the usual modal reasoning we conclude
✷
k(¬u:P ∧ u:P ); hence ✷k⊥, a contradiction. ✷
Now, to get Theorem 5, it suffices to refer to a well-known fact:
Lemma 2
¬⊥ ≺ ¬✷⊥ ≺ ¬✷2⊥ ≺ ¬✷3⊥ ≺ . . . ≺ ✷P→P.
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Proof.
a) For k ≥ 1, by transitivity, GL ⊢ ✷k−1⊥→✷k⊥, hence GL ⊢ ¬✷k⊥→
¬✷k−1⊥. By the arithmetical soundness of GL,
¬✷k−1⊥  ¬✷k⊥.
Modal formula ✷k⊥→✷k−1⊥ is false at the root of a k-node linear model,
hence not provable in GL. By the arithmetical completeness of GL, PA 6⊢
✷
k⊥→✷k−1⊥, hence
¬✷k⊥ 6 ¬✷k−1⊥,
therefore
¬✷k−1⊥ ≺ ¬✷k⊥.
b) For each k ≥ 0, ¬✷k⊥  ✷P→P . Indeed, cases of k = 0, 1 are trivial.
Consider k ≥ 2. From instances of ✷P→P
✷
k⊥→✷k−1⊥, ✷k−1⊥→✷k−2⊥, . . . ,✷⊥→⊥,
by a chain of syllogisms, we derive ✷k⊥→⊥, and hence
PA+ {[✷P→P ]∗} ⊢ ¬✷k⊥.
c) For any k ≥ 0, ✷P→P 6 ¬✷k⊥. Suppose the opposite, namely, that
for some k ≥ 0, ✷P→P  ¬✷k⊥. Since, by b),
¬✷k+1⊥  ✷P→P,
we have ¬✷k+1⊥  ¬✷k⊥, which is impossible, by a). ✷
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